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EMPLOYMENT LAW—MANDATORY-WORKPLACE DONNING AND 
DOFFING—ALL IN A DAY’S WORK: A REVIEW OF GERBER PRODUCTS 
COMPANY V. HEWITT, 2016 ARK. 222, 492 S.W.3D 856. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A factory employee’s shift does not begin for another hour, but she 
arrives early for work to perform activities that are required and strictly 
controlled by her employer whose goal is to produce high quality food 
products. Some of the activities include changing into and lint rolling her 
work uniform as well as putting on her protective gear. It is only after 
performing these mandatory pre-shift “donning”1 activities, and walking a 
lengthy distance to her workstation, that she is allowed to clock in for the 
start of her shift. These activities and the subsequent walking are performed 
without pay and extend her workweek beyond the forty-hour maximum. 
Highly unsatisfied with this practice and collective-bargaining efforts, she 
and some coworkers demand overtime payment for the time that they had 
spent donning, waiting, walking, and “doffing”2 in the past years. 
This scenario partly summarizes the facts of Gerber Products 
Company v. Hewitt, a case of first impression decided by Arkansas’s highest 
appellate court in 2016.3 In Gerber, hourly employees working at a Gerber 
facility in Fort Smith, Arkansas, filed a class action against Gerber for 
failing to compensate them for time they had spent completing mandatory 
donning and doffing activities at the workplace.4 Eventually, Gerber 
appealed the lower court’s ruling and judgment in favor of the employees.5 
Despite the sharp divide6 among the Arkansas Supreme Court justices, 
the court held that mandatory7 donning and doffing activities constitute 
“work” and must be compensated pursuant to the overtime provision of the 
 
 1. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 3. 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856, superseded by statute, Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 
914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 4. Id. at 1–2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 5. Id. at 7, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
 6. The sharp divide resulted from a 4–3 split among the justices. See Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, 492 S.W.3d 856. (Associate Justice Karen Baker, writing for the majority, was joined by 
Associate Justices Robin Wynne, Courtney Goodson, and Paul Danielson. Former Chief 
Justice Howard Brill and Associate Justice Josephine Hart joined the dissenting opinion 
written by Associate Justice Rhonda Wood.). 
 7. In this context and throughout this note, “mandatory” means activities or work that 
are “integral and indispensable” to an employee’s primary responsibilities. See infra note 56 
and accompanying text. 
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Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA).8 The court further held that it 
would not engraft the special carve-out exception for unionized employers 
found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) into the AMWA.9 
Consequently, Gerber and the union could not agree to waive compensation 
for mandatory donning and doffing at the workplace through the collective-
bargaining process.10 In 2017, the Arkansas General Assembly responded to 
the Gerber decision by amending the AMWA and simultaneously 
overturning Gerber.11 
In the workplace, to don means to remove personal clothing and shoes 
usually before the start of one’s shift in order to change into a work uniform, 
shoes, and/or protective gear such as a hairnet, a bump cap, safety glasses, 
and ear plugs.12 When one doffs in the workplace, he reverses the process: 
he takes off the work clothing, shoes, and/or protective gear and changes 
back into his personal clothing and shoes typically after his shift.13 Although 
relatively simple tasks, pre-shift donning, post-shift doffing, and related 
matters have led to an influx of litigation in federal courts within the past 
few years.14 
 
 8. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 14, 492 S.W.3d at 864. 
 9. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 864. 
 10. See id. at 10–14, 492 S.W.3d at 863–64. 
 11. Representative Charlie Collins sponsored “an act to amend and clarify the Minimum 
Wage Act of the State of Arkansas; to overrule Gerber Products Company v. Hewitt, 2016 
Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856; to declare an emergency; and for other purposes.” H.R. 1846, 91st 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). Eventually, the Arkansas General Assembly passed 
the bill, and Governor Asa Hutchinson signed it into law on April 5, 2017. See Act of Apr. 5, 
2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 12. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 5, 492 S.W.3d at 860. 
 13. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 860. 
 14. See, e.g., Adair v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 728 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that neither the time spent by laborers for donning and doffing uniforms nor the walking time 
between the clothes-changing stations and the time clock were compensable under the 
FLSA); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 958 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
FLSA § 203(o) provision applied to the donning and doffing activities at issue); Gorman v. 
Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that donning and doffing of 
a helmet, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots were not integral and indispensable to plaintiffs’ 
principal activities); Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, 805 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (E.D. Ark. 2011) 
(holding that donning and doffing of smocks by employees were integral and indispensable to 
their principal activities and should be compensated under the FLSA); Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (granting in 
part summary judgment for the employees that required donning and doffing of protective 
gear and walking to work stations were compensable under the FLSA and Wisconsin state 
wage law); Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1243–47 (D. Kan. 2007) 
(denying summary judgment for the employer on the basis that the Portal-to-Portal Act did 
not bar compensation for time spent donning and doffing standard protective clothing and 
gear and that prior injunction did not permit employer to pay for reasonable time as opposed 
to actual time spent donning and doffing). See also Amanda Walck, Taking It All Off: Salazar 
v. Butterball and the Battle over Fair Compensation Under the FLSA’s “Changing Clothes” 
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Donning and doffing issues are prevalent in the food-processing 
industry and in other industries where the law, the employer, or the nature of 
the job requires protective equipment.15 Despite requiring employees to don 
and doff clothing and protective gear at the workplace according to strict 
procedures, some employers still fail to compensate their employees for the 
time required to complete these mandatory activities, and such failure 
becomes “fertile ground for collective action litigation by employees.”16 
In such actions, employees argue that pre-shift donning and post-shift 
doffing extend the workweek beyond the forty-hour period, which entitles 
them to overtime compensation.17 Normally, employees choose to file their 
claims under the FLSA, but a miniscule percentage of cases have instead 
been filed under state minimum wage laws only because some state 
minimum wage laws lack certain employer-friendly exceptions found under 
the FLSA.18 Gerber falls into the latter group. 
Routinely in these cases, courts examine the meaning of “work”, which 
is not defined under the FLSA or under many state minimum wage laws 
such as the AMWA.19 In defending their pay practices, some employers turn 
to the FLSA § 203(o) exception and argue that they are not required to 
compensate for time spent engaging in strict, mandatory-workplace donning 
and doffing activities pursuant to a custom or practice under a collective-
bargaining agreement.20 Arkansas law does not include an analogous 
exception.21 
Despite legislative action to overturn Gerber, this note argues that the 
Arkansas Supreme Court properly decided the Gerber case. Part II explains 
the historical context and treatment of the donning and doffing issue while 
 
Provision, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 549, 561–62 (2012) (discussing multi-million-dollar 
settlements on behalf of employees who were not compensated for donning and doffing of 
personal protective equipment). 
 15. Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Continuous Confusion: Defining the 
Workday in the Modern Economy, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 370 (2011) (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMIN. INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-2 (June 16, 2010), 
superseded in part by case, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014)). 
 16. Joseph Gumina & Erica Reib, A Primer for Inside Counsel on Donning & Doffing 
under the FLSA, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.law.com/insidecounsel 
/almID/550aecb5150ba01826500f7a/ (summarizing when federal courts generally treat 
mandatory donning and doffing as compensable and non-compensable). 
 17. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1055 (2016); Mitchell 
v. JCG Indus., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 2–3, 
492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 18. See, e.g., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856. 
 19. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -221 (Repl. 2012 
& Supp. 2017); infra Part II.A–C. 
 20. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 21. See infra Part II.B–C. 
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simultaneously surveying the history of relevant federal and state laws.22 
Part II concludes by thoroughly examining the facts, holding, and 
subsequent history of Gerber.23 In highlighting the differences between the 
majority and minority opinions, Part III argues that the Gerber decision was 
neither a departure from precedent nor an unjustified ruling.24 From a policy 
perspective, Part IV elaborates on why Gerber was the right decision, 
signifying that the decision was justified and that it would not have hindered 
employer and employee relations in Arkansas.25 And finally, Part V 
proposes a legislative fix to a major, potential issue left unanswered by the 
2017 amendment of the AMWA.26 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section begins by discussing the federal statutes, cases, and 
regulations that affect the FLSA overtime-compensation requirement.27 
After discussing the interconnecting federal legal framework, this section 
continues by exploring the development and purpose of state minimum 
wage and overtime laws and their effect on compensation, with a special 
emphasis on the AMWA.28 Finally, this section concludes by thoroughly 
examining the procedural history, facts, holding, and subsequent history of 
Gerber, which involves some discussion about the FLSA and interpretation 
of the AMWA.29 
A. Federal Statutes, Cases, and Regulations 
An overview of the federal laws that affect the FLSA overtime-
compensation requirement provides the context for the evolvement of 
donning and doffing litigation. This subsection first examines the FLSA 
itself, which is the leading federal source governing wage and hour law.30 
Then, this subsection discusses the Portal-to-Portal Act, which is a relevant 
FLSA amendment that excludes certain types of activities from 
compensation.31 This subsection continues by reviewing mandatory 
compensation under the continuous-workday doctrine established by the 
 
 22. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. See infra Part II.A(1). 
 31. See infra Part II.A(2). 
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Supreme Court of the United States.32 Lastly, this subsection describes 
another relevant FLSA amendment known as the FLSA § 203(o), or 
“changing-clothes” exception, which honors customs and practices under 
bona-fide collective bargaining that exclude time for changing clothes from 
compensable work hours.33 
1. FLSA 
Enacted in 1938,34 “[t]he FLSA establishe[d] minimum wage, overtime 
pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees 
in the private sector and in Federal, State, and local governments.”35 This 
law provides individual coverage for employees engaged in interstate 
commerce or in the production of commercial goods for interstate 
commerce,36 and enterprise coverage for businesses with a total annual gross 
sales volume of $500,000 or more.37 The FLSA covers most workplaces 
because courts have defined the phrase “interstate commerce” broadly.38 
Specifically, the FLSA overtime provision provides, for non-exempt 
employees: 
[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek 
longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for 
his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less 
than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
39
 
The FLSA expressly defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit to 
work.”40 However, the statute does not define “work,” and the Supreme 
Court of the United States, when first defining the term, stated, 
[W]e cannot assume that Congress here was referring to work or 
employment other than as those words are commonly used—as meaning 
physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or 
 
 32. See infra Part II.A(3). 
 33. See infra Part II.A(4). 
 34. FLSA of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 35. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., Compliance Assistance - Wages and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Barbara Kate Repa, Who is Covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/employee-rights-book/chapter2-2.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
 40. Id. § 203(g). 
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required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the 
benefit of the employer and his business.
41
 
The Court clarified the definition of “work” by including duties that 
did not encompass any exertion.42 After that clarification, the meaning of 
“work” continued to evolve.43 
In Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Company,44 the Court defined 
the “statutory workweek” as “includ[ing] all time during which an employee 
is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty or at a 
prescribed workplace,”45 thereby, further expanding the meaning of “work” 
to include preliminary activities controlled by and performed for the benefit 
of the employer.46 In that case, the preliminary activities included donning 
duties, such as removing personal clothing; putting on aprons, overalls, and 
finger cots; and taping or greasing arms.47 The Court also ruled that time 
“spent walking to [a place to perform] work on the employer’s premise . . . 
was working time within the scope of [the FLSA].”48 
2. Portal-to-Portal Act 
After the Supreme Court of the United States expanded the meaning of 
“work” in its Anderson decision, Congress responded by amending the 
FLSA with new legislation known as the Portal-to-Portal Act.49 Congress 
took action in hopes of limiting what it perceived to be unfettered discretion 
displayed by the Court.50 It elaborated by stating “that the [FLSA] . . . has 
been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, 
practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating 
wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in 
operation, upon employers . . . .”51 Therefore, the Portal-to-Portal Act 
excludes the following from the FLSA coverage: (1) the time spent traveling 
to and from the location where an employee performs “principal activities” 
 
 41. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944), 
superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 42. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (stating that “an employer, if 
he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to 
happen”). 
 43. See Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), superseded by 
statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2012). 
 44. 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
 45. Id. at 690–91. 
 46. Id. at 693. 
 47. Id. at 692–93. 
 48. Id. at 691. 
 49. See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262 (2012). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. § 251(a). 
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and (2) both preliminary and postliminary activities occurring as a result of 
any “principal activity.”52 
The United States Department of Labor53 defined “principal activities” 
to include those “which the employee is employed to perform”54 along with 
“all activities which [sic] are an integral part of a principal activity.”55 
Moreover, the Court, during its first analysis and interpretation of the Portal-
to-Portal Act exemptions, created an exception to the exemptions by ruling 
that preliminary and postliminary activities, that are “an integral and 
indispensable part of the principal activities” whether performed “before or 
after the regular work shift, on or off the production line,” are compensable 
regardless of their bare-bones status as preliminary and postliminary under 
the Portal-to-Portal Act.56 This interpretation applies to both non-unionized 
and unionized work settings.57 
3. Continuous-Workday Doctrine 
Compensable work time is calculated based on the continuous-workday 
doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States.58 A 
“workday” is “the period between the commencement and completion on 
the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities.”59 This 
definition created an additional exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act 
exemptions: 
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the 
employee commences to perform the first principal activity on a 
particular workday and before he ceases the performance of the last 
 
 52. Id. § 254(a)(1)–(2). 
 53. The Department of Labor is an agency of the federal government responsible for 
administering employment regulations including wage and hour standards; the FLSA 
established the Department’s Wage and Hour Division to administer and enforce the Act. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Wage and Hour Division History, https://www.dol.gov/whd/about 
/history/whdhist.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 54. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(a) (2016). 
 55. Id. § 790.8(b). 
 56. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). See also Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 
F.3d 894, 902–03 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 21, 125 S. Ct. 514, 163 
L.Ed.2d 288 (2005) (defining “integral and indispensable” as “necessary to the principal 
work performed” and “done for the benefit of the employer”) (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 750 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S. 
Ct. 2116, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 
1976)). 
 57. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. 
 58. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005) (holding activities performed between 
the first and last principal activities of the workday are compensable as part of the 
“continuous workday”). See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6. 
 59. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b). 
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principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of [§ 4 of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act] have no application . . . .
60
 
In other words, compensation is required for activities occurring 
between the first and last “principal activities” of the day, even when the 
Portal-to-Portal Act expressly provides otherwise.61 The Court’s broad 
interpretation of activities that are “integral and indispensable” to a 
“principal activity” means that even those activities that an employer would 
not necessarily consider “principal activities,” such as intermittent donning 
and doffing, are “principal activities” that are compensable under the 
continuous workday.62 Similarly, employees must be compensated for 
activities, such as post-donning and pre-doffing waiting and walking, 
despite the Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions.63 
4. FLSA § 203(o): The “Changing-Clothes” Exception 
In 1949, Congress further amended the FLSA to include what has 
become known as the “changing-clothes” exception64 for unionized 
employers and employees.65 In determining the number of hours worked, 
this provision provides: 
[T]here shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing 
at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from 
measured working time during the week involved by the express terms 
of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement applicable to the particular employee.
66
 
Congress sought to preserve the contractual freedom and rights of 
unionized employers and employees granted through collective bargaining 
when it created the “changing-clothes” exception, which disregards the 
compensation requirement for all donning and doffing activities whether or 
not “integral and indispensable” to unionized employees’ primary jobs.67 
 
 60. Id. § 790.6(a) (further stating that “[p]eriods of time between the commencement of 
the employee’s first principal activity and the completion of his last principal activity on any 
workday must be included in the computation of hours worked to the same extent as would 
be required if the Portal Act had not been enacted”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Throughout this note, the “changing-clothes” exception and special carve-out 
exception are used interchangeably. 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012). See 95 Cong. Rec. 11,433 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1949) 
(comments of Rep. Herter) (stating that § 203(o) was enacted to “avoid[] another series of 
incidents which led to the [P]ortal-to-[P]ortal legislation . . .”). 
 66. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). 
 67. See id. § 251(b). 
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A typical donning and doffing case construing this exception involves 
the issues of whether donning and doffing protective gear is the same as 
“changing clothes” and whether compensation has been expressly waived 
through either a custom or practice under a bona-fide collective-bargaining 
agreement.68 In Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation,69 the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that some protective gear is clothing70 and as 
such, is subject to the “changing-clothes” exception for unionized 
employers.71 The Court also held that certain protective gear may not qualify 
as clothing,72 and changing into such gear must be compensated if a 
substantial amount of time is required to put on and remove those items.73 
B. State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: The AMWA 
The federal FLSA allows states to enact their own wage and hour 
laws.74 Most states enact these requirements to establish more protective 
standards for employees already covered under the FLSA or to establish 
provisions for employees who are not covered by the federal law.75 When 
both the federal and state laws apply, employers must comply with the more 
stringent standard.76 
 
 68. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 69. 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014). 
 70. Id. at 878. See id. at 876 (defining clothes as “items that are both designed and used 
to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of dress”) (citing WEBSTER’S NEW 
INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE 507 (2d ed. 1950); 2 OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 
524 (1933)). 
 71. Id. at 879. 
 72. Id. at 878 (excluding the following items from the definition of clothes: wearable 
accessories, tools, and equipment that are not commonly regarded as articles of dress) (citing 
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F3d 1130, 1139–1140 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 73. Id. at 880 (quoting in part Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 
692 (1946)) (In Anderson, the Supreme Court of the United States summarized its de minimis 
doctrine: “[t]he workweek . . . must be computed in light of the realities of the industrial 
world. When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the 
scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not 
justified by the actualities of working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and 
effort that compensable working time is involved.”). 
 74. See 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2012). 
 75. See id. See also Gerald Mayer, Benjamin Collins & David H. Bradley, 
CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: AN OVERVIEW (2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42713.pdf. 
 76. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (stating in part that “[n]o provision of this chapter or of any 
order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal 
ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under 
this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under 
this chapter . . . .”). 
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In 1968, the Arkansas General Assembly passed the AMWA.77 The 
AMWA established a minimum wage for employees in Arkansas to protect 
their health, efficiency, and general well-being.78 It covers employers who 
employ more than four employees,79 but the statute leaves uncovered several 
categories of employees.80 It includes an overtime provision identical to that 
of the FLSA81 and does not define the term “work.”82 
The AMWA has been amended several times.83 With the 2007 
amendment, the Arkansas General Assembly incorporated certain provisions 
of the FLSA into the AMWA,84 but these revisions to the AMWA did not 
incorporate the special carve-out exception.85 Additionally, the Arkansas 
General Assembly overturned the Gerber decision concurrently with its 
2017 amendment of the AMWA.86 
C.  Gerber v. Hewitt 
This subsection analyzes the Gerber case according to its procedural 
posture by first reviewing the relevant aspects of the circuit court’s 
 
 77. AMWA of 1968, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 78. Id. § 11-4-202. 
 79. Id. § 11-4-203(4)(B). Originally, the AMWA exempted employers covered by the 
FLSA, but in 2006, it was amended to include all employers with four or more employers 
regardless of prior FLSA coverage. See “An Act to Revise the Minimum Wage Act of the 
State of Arkansas . . .” (Act of Apr. 10, 2006, No. 16, 2006 Ark. Acts 16; Act of Apr. 10, 
2006, No. 15, 2006 Ark. Acts 15). The amendment also provided a private right of action 
under § 11-4-218. Id. 
 80. For example, excluded from the definition of employee includes students performing 
services for schools that they attend, federal employees, bona fide independent contractors, 
and workers engaging in the production of livestock. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-203(3)(A)–
(R). See ARK. DEPT. OF LABOR, Fact Sheet on the Increase of the Arkansas Minimum Wage, 
http://www.labor.arkansas.gov/Websites/labor/images/FactSheetIncreaseArkansasMinimum
Wage.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2017) (exempting employees from both the minimum wage 
and overtime provisions or just the overtime provision solely). 
 81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-211(a) (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this 
section and §§ 11-4-210 and 11-4-212, no employer shall employ any of his or her employees 
for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless the employee receives compensation for 
his or her employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and 
one-half (1 1/2) times the regular rate of pay at which he or she is employed”). 
 82. See id. § 11-4-203. 
 83. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914; Act of Apr. 11, 2013, 
No. 1128, 2013 Ark. Acts 1128; Act of Mar. 21, 2013, No. 457, 2013 Ark. Acts 457; Act of 
Mar. 28, 2007, No. 545, 2007 Ark. Acts 545. 
 84. Appellees’ Brief at Arg. 4, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (citing “An Act 
to Amend the Minimum Wage and Overtime Law to Parallel Certain Provisions of Federal 
Minimum Wage and Overtime Law . . .” (Act of Mar. 28, 2007, No. 545, 2007 Ark. Acts 
545)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914. 
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decision.87 Subsequently, this subsection reviews the relevant aspects of the 
appellate court’s decision.88 In reviewing the appellate court’s decision, this 
subsection first summarizes the majority opinion,89 which is followed by a 
summary of the dissenting opinion.90 This subsection concludes by 
discussing the legislative action to overturn Gerber in 2017.91 
1. Trial Level 
On June 6, 2012, a group of employees filed a class action against 
Gerber Products Company (“Gerber”) in the Sebastian County Circuit Court 
in Arkansas.92 Subject to the AMWA overtime requirement, the named 
Plaintiffs, serving as the proposed class-action representatives, worked as 
non-exempt, hourly employees at Gerber’s baby-food processing and 
manufacturing facility in Fort Smith, Arkansas.93 The putative class included 
non-exempt, hourly persons required to perform mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing activities without compensation.94 The class also 
included individuals who were or would be employed by Gerber at the Fort 
Smith facility “at any time within the three years prior to the filing of the 
[c]omplaint through the date of the final disposition of [the] action.”95 
Plaintiffs asserted that Gerber had violated the AMWA by not fully 
compensating them for all the time worked at the facility.96 Specifically, 
Plaintiffs first alleged that they had not received any compensation for time 
spent donning, doffing, sanitizing clothing and equipment, washing their 
hands, and walking to and from their work stations, which were all 
“necessary and indispensable to their principal [job]” of producing safe food 
products.97 They alleged that these activities had extended their work time 
 
 87. See infra Part II.C(1). 
 88. See infra Part II.C(2)–(3). 
 89. See infra Part II.C(2). 
 90. See infra Part II.C(3). 
 91. See infra Part II.C(4). 
 92. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 1, Hewitt v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. CV-12-715 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 
June 6, 2012). See also Gerber Prod. Co. v. Hewitt, 2016 Ark. 222, at 1–2, 492 S.W.3d 856, 
858. 
 93. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 2–3, ¶¶ 7–11, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 
2016 Ark. 222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 94. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 2, ¶ 4, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 2, ¶ 2, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 97. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 2, ¶ 3, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
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beyond the maximum forty-hour workweek, and thus, they were entitled to 
overtime pay.98 
Plaintiffs described their workday in the following manner. Gerber had 
required them to wear their personal clothing onto the premises.99 
Subsequently, they had to walk through an electronic-controlled turnstile 
that records the time when each employee arrives to begin the workday.100 
After walking through the turnstile, Plaintiffs had to walk to locker rooms 
and dressing areas to don Gerber-supplied uniforms and shoes that were 
required to be kept at the facility.101 They had to use a lint roller to remove 
lint and fuzz from their clothing; had to don protective gear such as hairnets, 
beard nets, ear plugs, and bump caps; and had to wash their hands.102 After 
all this, Plaintiffs were finally allowed to clock in after walking a significant 
distance.103 Once their shifts were completed, they were required to clock 
out and then were permitted to doff their protective clothing and gear in 
order to change back into their personal clothing and shoes.104 
In its answer, Gerber disputed the facts and asserted that federal law 
preempted Plaintiffs’ state law claims because Plaintiffs joined the union as 
members, that the union negotiated with Gerber to decide whether time 
spent donning and doffing required both clothing and protective gear, and 
that the union also negotiated whether such time would be compensable.105 
Gerber unsuccessfully tried to remove the case to federal court twice,106 and 
each time, the federal court remanded it back to the state circuit court.107 
 
 98. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4, ¶ 17, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 99. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4, ¶ 19, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 100. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4, ¶ 19, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 101. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4-5, ¶ 20, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 2–3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 102. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 5, ¶¶ 22–23, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 103. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 5, ¶ 24, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 104. Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 5, ¶ 25, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 
222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
 105. Defendant’s Answer at 8, ¶¶ 2–3, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856. 
 106. See Hewitt v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02117, 2014 WL 4494736 (W.D. Ark. 
July 18, 2014) (second removal attempt). See also Hewitt v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 2:13-CV-
02117, 2013 WL 5786089 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2013) (first removal attempt). 
 107. Hewitt, No. 2:13-CV-02117, 2014 WL 4494736; Hewitt, 2:13-CV-02117, 2013 WL 
5786089. 
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The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in August 
2014.108 The circuit court allowed Plaintiffs’ AMWA claim to proceed to 
trial,109 and three days before the start of trial, the circuit court granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion for partial-summary judgment and denied Gerber’s 
motion for reconsideration.110 The order specifically said in part, 
The Court concludes that the [AMWA] requires that the employer, 
[Gerber], treat the time required by employees to complete the 
mandatory Donning and Doffing activities at issue in this lawsuit as 
compensable work time, notwithstanding any contrary custom or 
practice under a collective bargaining agreement applicable to those 
employees or any express agreement. The [AMWA] does not incorporate 
the federal 203(o) exemption for clothes changing time in unionized 
facilities. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Gerber 
employed 4 or more individuals and that the class members worked more 
than 40 hours in one or more workweeks. Gerber did not treat the 
mandatory Donning and Doffing activities as compensable work time, 




The circuit court entered its final judgment pursuant to both its January 
2015 order and the parties’ stipulations to the remaining issues of fact and 
procedure.112 Therefore, the circuit court awarded damages in the amount of 
 
 108. Plaintiffs argued the following: changing clothes, washing, walking, and waiting are 
“work” under the AMWA; the AMWA is not a carbon copy of the FLSA, the AMWA does 
not incorporate the FLSA § 203(o) exception, and the exception does not fit within the 
contours of the AMWA; and the Labor Management Relations Act does not preempt the 
AMWA. See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial-Summary Judgment at 7–26, 
Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d 859. Gerber 
asserted that the donning and doffing claim under the AMWA should be dismissed because 
the AMWA should be interpreted consistently with the FLSA; that the donning and doffing 
time is not compensable under the FLSA; that the FLSA’s “hours worked” definition, i.e. § 
203(o), applies to the AMWA; and that the Plaintiffs’ claim for walking time must be 
dismissed as well. See Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 16–
29, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715. See also Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 859. 
 109. Circuit Court Order, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715 (Nov. 3, 2014). See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 4, 492 S.W.3d at 859. 
 110. Circuit Court Order, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715 (Jan. 23, 2015). See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 4, 492 S.W.3d at 859. 
 111. Circuit Court Order, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715 (Jan. 23, 2015). See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 5–6, 492 S.W.3d at 860–61. (The circuit court also viewed post-donning and pre-
doffing walking time as compensable work time, i.e., walking occurring after mandatory 
donning and walking occurring before mandatory doffing are a part of the continuous 
workday. The circuit court did not rule on a formula for the calculation of damages; it set a 
trial date of January 26, 2015 for a jury to decide the amount of time required by the 
employees to perform the mandatory donning and doffing). 
 112. Circuit Court Order, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715 (Aug. 4, 2015). See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 6–7, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
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$3,001,669.84, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, to 
Plaintiffs.113 
2. Appellate Level – Majority Opinion 
Unsatisfied with the circuit court’s ruling and judgment, Gerber 
appealed,114 and the Arkansas Supreme Court heard the matter.115 The court 
first decided the issue of “whether the mandatory donning and doffing 
activities constitute compensable work time pursuant to the AMWA despite 
contrary custom and practice under [Gerber and the union’s] collective-
bargaining agreement.”116 The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the 
statutory interpretation issue de novo while giving effect to the intent of the 
Arkansas General Assembly.117 
After acknowledging that the AMWA does not specifically define the 
term “work,” the majority defined “work” according to its ordinary and 
plain language as “an ‘activity in which one exerts strength or faculties to do 
or perform.’”118 Subsequently, the majority held that the mandatory donning 
and doffing activities constitute “work” because Gerber required that these 
activities be performed according to strict procedures and that such activities 
benefitted Gerber by reducing workplace injury and contamination.119 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court also relied on the Arkansas Department of 
Labor’s120 (ADOL) regulations to support its holding.121 
 
 113. Circuit Court Order, Hewitt, No. CV-12-715 (Aug. 4, 2015). See also Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, at 7, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
 114. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 7, 492 S.W.3d 861. 
 115. See Arkansas Supreme Court Order Granting Transfer (Feb. 25, 2016), Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856. See also Appellees’ Motion to Transfer This Appeal to the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (alleging that the appeal 
“involves an issue of first impression, presents significant issues needing clarification of 
Arkansas law, and involves substantial questions of law concerning the construction and 
interpretation of the [AMWA]”). 
 116. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 7, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
 117. Id. at 8, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
 118. Id. at 9, 492 S.W.3d at 862 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2634 
(1993)). 
 119. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 862. 
 120. The Arkansas Department of Labor is a governmental agency in charge of enforcing 
Arkansas labor laws. It is composed of four divisions, including the Labor Standards Division 
which oversees the states’ minimum wage and overtime laws. See ARK. DEP’T. OF LAB., 
Mission, Vision, Values, http://www.labor.arkansas.gov/mission (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 121. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 9, 492 S.W.3d at 862 (citing 010 ARK. CODE R. § 14.1–
108(A)(1) which states that “[w]ork not requested but suffered or permitted is work time. For 
example, an employee may voluntarily continue to work at the end of the shift. He may be a 
pieceworker, he may desire to finish an assigned task or he may wish to correct errors, paste 
work tickets, prepare time reports or other records. The reason is immaterial. The employer 
knows or has reason to believe that he is continuing to work and the time is working time;” 
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After interpreting the definition of “work” to include mandatory 
donning and doffing activities controlled by and for the benefit of the 
employer, the court then answered whether Gerber and the union were 
allowed to negotiate away compensable work time through the collective-
bargaining process.122 The majority examined Gerber’s arguments and stated 
that when reading the entire AMWA in an effort to ascertain the 
legislature’s intent, it is clear that had the Arkansas General Assembly 
wanted to include a “changing-clothes” exception for collective-bargaining 
units, it would have done so.123 The majority chose not to engraft the 
“changing-clothes” exception into the AMWA, thereby, affirming the circuit 
court’s ruling.124 
3. Appellate Level – Dissenting Opinion 
The three-member dissent stated that litigation would increase in 
Arkansas and that the collective-bargaining process would be less effective 
as a result of the majority’s holding in Gerber, which mimicked the past 
mistakes of the federal government.125 In declaring these points, the dissent 
discussed the clashing between the Supreme Court of the United States and 
Congress that resulted from the Court’s initial interpretations of “work” and 
“workweek” following the enactment of the FLSA.126 Likewise, the 
dissenting justices viewed the majority’s holding in Gerber as detrimental 
and analogized it with the Court’s holdings prior to Congress amending the 
FLSA with the Portal-to-Portal Act and the special carve-out exception.127 
The dissent further argued that the ADOL, pursuant to the AMWA 
regulations, is instructed to use the FLSA precedent established under 
federal law.128 The dissent asserted that not only is the ADOL instructed to 
look to federal guidance when interpreting the AMWA but that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court usually turns to federal guidance when a state statute is 
silent on an issue.129 In other words, the dissent contended that the majority 
 
citing ARK. CODE R. 010 § 14.1–108(A)(3) which states, “In all such cases it is the duty of the 
management to exercise its control and see that the work is not performed if it does not want 
it to be performed. It cannot sit back and accept the benefits without compensating for them;” 
citing ARK. CODE R. 010 § 14.1–108(B)(2) which “provides that waiting time, while on duty, 
is considered worktime if the employee is unable to use the time effectively for his own 
purpose”). 
 122. Id. at 10–11, 492 S.W.3d at 863. 
 123. Id. at 11–14, 492 S.W.3d at 863–64. 
 124. Id. at 14, 492 S.W.3d at 864. 
 125. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 865 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 14–15, 492 S.W.3d at 865 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 127. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 14–15, 492 S.W.3d at 865 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 15–16, 492 S.W.3d at 865–66 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 16, 492 S.W.3d at 865–66 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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departed from precedent by failing to follow the FLSA because the AMWA 
is silent on the special carve-out exception.130 For additional support, the 
dissent mentioned that other state courts have turned to the FLSA for 
direction when their state labor statutes failed to address certain issues.131 
The dissent continued by stating that Gerber and the union are 
sophisticated parties; therefore, their long-established contracts and customs 
should not be disregarded.132 It specifically argued that the AMWA should 
be interpreted in a way that does not hinder collective bargaining and stated 
that the majority’s holding has now obviously interfered with the parties’ 
right to bargain as they see fit.133 Lastly, the dissenting justices contended 
that an employee is only entitled to the AMWA remedies when an employer 
has failed to pay, at the very least, the required minimum wages, and that 
was not the case in Gerber because many of the employees in the class 
earned almost three times the minimum wage.134 
4. The AMWA Amended and Gerber Overturned 
Using the dissenting opinion as its basis, the Arkansas General 
Assembly enacted an Act (the “Act”) in 2017 to amend and clarify the 
AMWA and to overrule Gerber.135 First, the legislature amended sections 
11-4-205 (Rights of Collective Bargaining Not Affected) and 11-4-218 
(Employee’s Remedies) of the AMWA.136 Then, it added a new section, 11-
4-221, that excuses employers who fail to provide compensation for certain 
types of activities.137 
As amended, section 11-4-205, which the dissent used for support, 
states, “Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of § 11-4-
218(b), shall be deemed to interfere with, impede, or in any way diminish 
the right of employers and employees to bargain collectively . . . in order to 
establish wages or other conditions of work.”138 The legislature added the 
words “including the provisions of § 11-4-218(b),” which did not exist when 
the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Gerber. Section 11-4-218(b) states 
that “[a]ny agreement between the employee and employer to work for less 
 
 130. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 865–66 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 17, 492 S.W.3d at 866 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id., 492 S.W.3d 866 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 133. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 17–18, 492 S.W.3d at 866–67 (Wood, J., dissenting) 
(citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-205 (Repl. 2012)). 
 134. Id. at 18, 492 S.W.3d at 867 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-
218(a)–(b)). 
 135. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 
11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-205 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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than minimum wages [including overtime pay] shall be no defense to” a 
lawsuit filed under the AMWA.139 The legislature inserted the additional 
words to prevent section 11-4-218(b) from interfering with collective-
bargaining rights under section 11-4-205.140 
The Arkansas General Assembly also added subsection (f) to section 
11-4-218.141 The AMWA now includes language indicating that a court may 
look to other state and federal decisions interpreting the FLSA as guidance 
when interpreting the AMWA.142 Furthermore, the newly added section 11-
4-221 is an exact rendition of the Portal-to-Portal Act,143 which currently 
amends the FLSA. Therefore, preliminary and postliminary activities, such 
as mandatory-workplace donning and doffing, are not automatically 
compensable unless expressly provided for in a contract, through custom, or 
through practice.144 
III. ARGUMENT 
Despite the dissent’s attack on the Gerber holding and the subsequent 
enactment of the 2017 Act, this note argues that the Arkansas Supreme 
Court properly decided Gerber. Specifically, all mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing activities constitute “work” under the AMWA. The 
Gerber decision, serving as the bright-line law, had required compensation 
for these activities,145 but the Arkansas General Assembly’s action destroyed 
this clarity.146 
Considering that federal precedent is only viewed as persuasive 
authority when interpreting the amended AMWA,147 one question that 
remains unresolved is how should courts interpret the Arkansas Portal-to-
Portal Act in matters not involving collective-bargaining agreements that 
expressly waive compensation for these mandatory activities.148 This 
question is not addressed by the 2017 Act149 and will pose a problem for 
courts should it arise.150 Additionally, when the Arkansas Supreme Court 
 
 139. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914. 
 140. Id. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(b). 
 141. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(f). See Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-221. See Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856. 
 146. See Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 147. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(f) (Supp. 2017). 
 148. See infra Part V (proposal to address this issue). 
 149. See Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 150. See infra Part V. 
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decided Gerber, the majority had interpreted the AMWA correctly.151 Thus, 
excluding the FLSA § 203(o) special carve-out exception was proper. 
The subsequent discussion counterattacks the dissent’s arguments 
while simultaneously addressing the 2017 Act. The dissent’s arguments are 
categorized into three broad categories: repeating the past mistakes of the 
federal government,152 failing to seek federal guidance,153 and undermining 
the collective-bargaining process.154 Each argument is addressed 
accordingly. 
A. Repeating the Past Mistakes of the Federal Government 
The majority’s holding was not a rendition of the alleged federal 
government’s past mistakes.155 In emphasizing that litigation in Arkansas 
will increase and businesses will suffer, the dissent quoted the Supreme 
Court of the United States saying, “In the six months following this Court’s 
decision in Anderson [determining the “statutory workweek”], unions and 
employees filed more than 1,500 lawsuits under [the] FLSA. These suits 
sought nearly $6 billion in backpay and liquidated damages for various 
preshift and postshift activities.”156 The dissent acknowledged Congress’s 
quick enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act.157 
Had Gerber not been overturned, it is possible that Arkansas courts 
might have experienced an increase in cases that relate to mandatory-
workplace donning and doffing if employers had failed to compensate 
employees for these activities. However, this possibility would have 
substantially dissipated as time passed. Most significantly, the holding 
provided Arkansas unions, employees, and employers with a definitive 
answer as to whether mandatory-workplace donning and doffing activities 
constitute “work” under the AMWA.158 Under Arkansas law, the Gerber 
holding clearly stated that all mandatory-workplace donning and doffing of 
both clothing and protective gear, which were considered “work” before 
 
 151. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856. 
 152. See infra Part III.A. 
 153. See infra Part III.B. 
 154. See infra Part III.C. 
 155. See Gerber, 2016 Ark. 22, at 14, 492 S.W.3d at 864 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 156. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 15, 492 S.W.3d at 865 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517 (2014)). 
 157. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 865 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 158. See Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 862. See also Kevin McGowan, 
Gerber Liable for $3M in Donning and Doffing Case (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/gerber-liable-for3m-n57982073244/ (quoting Plaintiffs’ Attorney Tim 
Steadman saying, “The ruling should ‘ultimately reduce litigation’ because the court 
provided a definitive answer to an open issue under state law.”). 
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Gerber was overturned, must be compensated.159 With this understanding, 
litigation in Arkansas would have decreased due to the majority’s clarity in 
answering an open issue of state law. 
However, the recently added AMWA provision, that grants courts with 
the permissive discretion to seek guidance from other state and federal 
courts when interpreting the AMWA, adds no real substance and could 
potentially create inconsistent rulings.160 For a case involving a non-
unionized employer or unionized employer without a collective-bargaining 
agreement that expressly waives compensation, one court may choose to 
review federal guidance. In doing so, the court would recognize that 
mandatory-workplace donning and doffing activities that are “integral and 
indispensable” to an employee’s principal job require compensation in spite 
of the Portal-to-Portal Act exemption for preliminary and postliminary 
activities.161 On the other hand, now that the AMWA has its own Portal-to-
Portal Act language,162 a court choosing not to review federal guidance 
would not necessarily be inclined to require compensation for such 
mandatory activities based on the AMWA statutory language alone. Without 
any binding-state case law, such potential inconsistency runs the risks of 
creating uncertainty and diluting judicial efficiency. At the very least, the 
Gerber ruling provided all Arkansas employers with clarity to an open issue 
of state law, i.e., it affirmatively answered whether mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing activities constitute “work,” which should be 
compensated, in both non-unionized and unionized settings.163 
Secondly, the AMWA statute of limitations period is three years;164 
therefore, any claims under the AMWA must be brought within three years 
from their accrual. The statutory period applies equally to all alleged claims 
of compensation violations, including those relating to mandatory-
workplace donning and doffing under Arkansas law.165 This statute of 
limitations period serves as a defense for employers and limits which cases 
proceed through the litigation process.166 
Lastly, employees deserve to be paid for their work. While Congress 
sought to minimize the effects of the broad interpretations of “work” and 
“workweek” by the Supreme Court of the United States, one must 
 
 159. See Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 2, 492 S.W.3d at 862. 
 160. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(f) (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). See also Act of Apr. 
5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE. ANN §§ 11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 161. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). 
 162. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-221 (Supp. 2017). 
 163. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 10, 492 S.W.3d at 862. 
 164. Douglas v. First Student, Inc., 2011 Ark. 463, at 6, 385 S.W.3d 225, 228. 
 165. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 228. 
 166. Id., 385 S.W.3d at 228. 
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understand that Congress enacted the FLSA to benefit employees.167 
Consequently, any reasonable interpretation of the FLSA must be in favor of 
employees.168 This standard is equally true for the AMWA.169 
When deciding Gerber, the majority recognized that the AMWA is to 
be liberally construed in favor of its public policy or purpose:170 “To 
establish minimum wages for workers in order to safeguard their health, 
efficiency, and general well-being and to protect them as well as their 
employers from the effects of serious and unfair competition resulting from 
wage levels detrimental to their health, efficiency, and well-being.”171 The 
term “minimum wages” can reasonably be construed to include overtime 
compensation as well.172 Accordingly, the statute’s employee-driven purpose 
supports the majority’s former interpretation of “work” under the AMWA, 
which included compensable mandatory-workplace donning and doffing 
activities under the AMWA.173 
B. Failing to Seek Federal Guidance 
Before Gerber was overturned, neither the ADOL nor the courts had 
been required to seek or follow other state or federal law, and the same still 
holds true although Gerber has been overturned. The AMWA regulations 
instruct the ADOL to turn to two sources of federal law as a guide,174 but 
when the dissent stated that the ADOL is instructed to look to federal 
guidance when interpreting the AMWA, the dissent had ignored the 
permissive language of “may” and the phrasing “except to the extent a 
different interpretation is clearly required,” which is found in the applicable 
regulation.175 
“May” simply implies “[t]o be permitted to” or “[t]o be a 
possibility.”176 Although some courts interpret “may” as meaning “shall,” 
Arkansas courts have reviewed many statutes that include the term “may” 
 
 167. See Anderson, 328 U.S 680; Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. 590. See also Jennifer Clemons, 
FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 535–38 
(2001) (introducing and explaining the historical background of the FLSA). 
 168. See Clemons, supra note 167, at 535–38. 
 169. See infra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-204(b) (Repl. 2012). 
 171. Id. § 11-4-202 (emphasis added). 
 172. See id. § 11-4-218(a)(1). See also infra Part III.C. 
 173. See id. § 11-4-202. 
 174. “The department may rely on [1] the interpretations of the U.S. Department of Labor 
and [2] federal precedent established under the Fair Labor Standards Act in interpreting and 
applying the provisions of the Act and Rule 010.14-100 through -113, except to the extent a 
different interpretation is clearly required.” ARK. CODE R. § 010.14–112 (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. 
 176. May, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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and have expressly indicated that such interpretation is not mandatory or 
direct.177 If that holds true for statutes, the same reasoning can be applied to 
regulations that include the same permissive wording. Because “may” is 
generally considered permissive, the ADOL is not obligated to look to 
sources of federal law when interpreting or applying the AMWA. 
The phrasing in the ADOL regulation, which says, “except to the 
extent a different interpretation is clearly required,” actually restricts when 
the ADOL should seek federal guidance when interpreting the AMWA.178 
The AMWA does not contain the FLSA “changing-clothes” exception.179 
Because there is no analogous AMWA special carve-out provision, there 
would not have been any need for the ADOL, if it were involved with the 
Gerber case, to seek federal guidance for a provision that does not exist.180 
Thus, a different interpretation of the AMWA, in comparison to federal 
guidance, would have been required. 
Furthermore, the FLSA “changing-clothes” exception itself is neither 
an interpretation of the United States Department of Labor nor federal 
precedent.181 It is a mere policy choice incorporated into the FLSA by 
Congress in response to federal precedent set by the Supreme Court of the 
United States and to interpretations supplied by the United States 
Department of Labor.182 Accordingly, the exception itself would not have to 
be relied upon by the ADOL because it is not a federal interpretation or 
precedent.183 
Secondly, the dissent’s forceful contention that the majority departed 
from precedent by failing to look at analogous federal statutes and 
precedent184 is an exaggeration at best. The dissent stated that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court typically turns to federal statutes and precedent when state 
statutes are silent on an issue.185 This assertion led the Arkansas General 
Assembly to add section 11-4-218(f), which states, “[A] court may look for 
 
 177. “The operative word in this statute is ‘may.’ The word ‘may’ is usually employed as 
implying permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is 
construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is 
used.” Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153, 164, 40 S.W.3d 230, 237 (2001); see Michael W. 
Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How Arkansas Courts Interpret Statutes. A 
Rational Approach, 2005 Ark. L. Notes 73. 
 178. Appellees’ Brief at Arg. 14, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-
966). 
 179. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017), with 29 
U.S.C §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 180. Appellees’ Brief at Arg. 14–15, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-
15-966). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 16, 492 S.W.3d at 865–66 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 865–66 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the [FLSA] . . . as it 
existed on January 1, 2017, which . . . shall have persuasive authority.”186 
In response to the dissent’s argument, Arkansas courts have sought 
guidance from federal law on some state matters, but Arkansas courts have 
not followed federal guidance in every case. For example, when the 
Arkansas Supreme Court discussed assessing costs to a losing party in a 
case where such costs are authorized by rules or statutes, it stated, 
“[C]ontrary to [Appellant’s] assertion, federal case law offers 
no guidance. The federal rule (Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)) differs from our own, 
and there are federal statutes which specifically authorize taxing certain 
costs.”187 Likewise, in Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hospital,188 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the term “disability” under the Arkansas 
Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
refused to use the ADA and its interpretations as guidance to expand the 
state statutory definition of “disability.”189 To reiterate, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court does not always follow federal guidance. 
Moreover, the dissent’s implication that other state courts have 
followed the FLSA precedent when state labor laws are silent on issues190 is 
untenable. The cases that the dissent cites in support of this assertion are 
cases decided by federal courts construing state labor statutes.191 It is quite 
natural for federal courts to construe open issues of state law like that of 
federal law, but these interpretations are not binding authority on state 
courts.192 
The very fact that the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Arkansas remanded the Gerber case back to the state circuit court 
twice is significant. This federal court found that it had lacked jurisdiction 
 
 186. Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 
11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 187. Wood v. Tyler, 317 Ark. 319, 321–22, 877 S.W.2d 582, 583 (1994). 
 188. 347 Ark. 941, 69 S.W.3d 393 (2002). 
 189. Id., at 954, 69 S.W.3d 393, 401 (2002) (stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently offered its view that our court would interpret the Arkansas Civil Rights 
Act’s definition of “disability” in identical fashion to its federal corollary,” but the Arkansas 
Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth Circuit’s decision is not binding). 
 190. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 17, 492 S.W.3d at 866 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id., 492 S.W.3d at 866 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Blessed Home, 
Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 542, 550 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (the Eastern District of North Carolina 
interpreting the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act); Mitchell v. JCG Indus., 929 F. Supp. 2d 
827, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (the Northern District of Illinois interpreting the Illinois Minimum 
Wage and Hour Law); and Kirchoff v. Wipro, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1350 (W.D. Wash. 
2012) (the Western District of Washington interpreting the Washington Minimum Wage 
Act)). 
 192. Faulkner, 347 Ark. at 954, 69 S.W.3d at 401–02. 
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based on all three arguments asserted by Gerber for removal.193 Most 
notably, it concluded that it had lacked federal question jurisdiction because 
“the parties ha[d] a dispute over interpretation and application of Arkansas 
state law, not over the interpretation of a provision in the [collective-
bargaining agreement].”194 The Western District concluded that such a 
matter was best suited for state court and that it did not require the 
examination of any provisions governed by federal law or the application of 
any federal law.195 
Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Gerber as a case of 
first impression.196 The case itself revealed the dearth of donning and 
doffing litigation decided in state courts under state minimum wage and 
overtime laws solely.197 Two Illinois state cases have only referenced, but 
not resolved, the issue of whether state law requires compensation for 
mandatory-workplace donning and doffing.198 Without any binding 
precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court had the right to construe the 
AMWA and resolve the instant statutory interpretation issue. This was 
consistent with state precedent, not a departure from it.199 
Although the amended AMWA now contains a provision that states a 
court may use persuasive authority when interpreting the AMWA, such an 
amendment is still permissive in nature.200 The added provision only 
confirms what has always been understood: that courts can always look to 
other state and federal courts as persuasive authority to interpret similar 
statutory language.201 However, courts are not required to do so.202 To 
reiterate, the provision adds no real value and could potentially create 
inconsistent court rulings. 
 
 193. Hewitt v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02117, 2014 WL 4494736 (W.D. Ark. 
July 18, 2014) (second removal attempt); Hewitt v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. 2:13-CV-02117, 
2013 WL 5786089 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2013) (first removal attempt). 
 194. Hewitt, 2:13-CV-02117, 2014 WL 4494736; Hewitt, 2:13-CV-02117, 2013 WL 
5786089. 
 195. Hewitt, 2:13-CV-02117, 2014 WL 4494736; Hewitt, 2:13-CV-02117, 2013 WL 
5786089. 
 196. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 8, 492 S.W.3d at 861. 
 197. Appellant’s Brief at Ab. 17 & 23, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-
15-966) (acknowledging the scarcity of applicable cases). 
 198. Carletto v. Quantum Foods, Inc., No. 1-05-3163, 2006 WL 2018250 (Ill. App. Ct. 
June 5, 2006); Porter v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 4-12-0258, 2012 WL 7051311 (Ill. 
App. Ct. Dec. 10, 2012). 
 199. See Michael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How Arkansas 
Courts Interpret Statutes. A Rational Approach, 2005 ARK. L. NOTES 73 (2005). 
 200. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(f) (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017). See Act of Apr. 5, 2017, 
No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-205, -218, -221). 
 201. See § 11-4-218(f). See also Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 914. 
 202. Id. 
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C. Undermining the Collective-Bargaining Process 
Before the Arkansas General Assembly overturned Gerber, employers, 
employees, and unions could have still negotiated donning and doffing 
related matters despite the Gerber holding. The collective-bargaining 
process remained intact. Although the dissent suggested otherwise, the 
collective-bargaining process had not been weakened, which is evidenced 
by Gerber and the union’s own actions. In negotiating the 2013–2016 
collective-bargaining agreement, the union had proposed that Gerber pay all 
union employees “30 minutes per day for donning and doffing including 
(changing of uniforms, shoes, linting off, washing hand[s] and donning 
[personal protective equipment]).”203 Ultimately, the negotiations led Gerber 
to treat the mandatory-workplace donning and doffing time as compensable, 
but the agreement had restricted the terms of compensability.204 With prior 
agreements, Gerber had refused to provide compensation for these 
mandatory activities.205 
According to the 2013–2016 agreement, Gerber and the union had 
determined the amount of compensation by the length of time it took a 
Gerber employee to don and doff,206 and they had determined the length of 
time required to don and doff according to the employee’s work area.207 
Therefore, Gerber and the union’s collective bargaining had determined that 
employees would be compensated for donning and doffing time that ranged 
between six to twelve minutes.208 
Gerber had maintained control as to how much time it would pay an 
employee to don and doff.209 This process confirms that employers and 
unions would have been allowed to negotiate a reasonable length of time in 
which employees would be paid for mandatory-workplace donning and 
doffing, and these contracts would have been enforceable. This contradicts 
any contention that suggests the collective-bargaining process was 
undermined. 
Secondly, when the court decided Gerber, there was evidence 
suggesting that the Arkansas General Assembly intentionally omitted the 
FLSA special carve-out exception. Beginning in 2007, the Arkansas General 
Assembly amended the AMWA three times, but these amendments had 
 
 203. Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Gerber, 2016 
Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
 204. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
 205. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 3–4, 492 S.W.3d at 859. 
 206. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial-Summary Judgment at 5, Gerber, 
2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
 207. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
 208. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
 209. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-12-715). 
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never incorporated the FLSA special carve-out exception.210 The Arkansas 
General Assembly passed a bill to initiate the 2007 amendment entitled “An 
Act to Amend the Minimum Wage and Overtime Law to Parallel Certain 
Provisions of Federal Minimum Wage and Overtime Law; And For Other 
Purposes.”211 The fact that this amendment did not include the FLSA special 
carve-out exception was probative because the Arkansas General Assembly 
had intended for the amendment to align the AMWA with the FLSA in 
some ways.212 The omission suggested that the AMWA should have been 
interpreted in a way that disregarded the special carve-out exception. 
Omitting the exception was furthered supported by the fact that the version 
of the statute, in place when the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Gerber, 
had indicated that agreements between the parties that had reduced 
minimum wage, including overtime compensation, would not serve as an 
employer defense for an action filed under the AMWA.213 Therefore, if a 
collective-bargaining agreement eliminating overtime compensation would 
not have been applicable at the outset, then most certainly an omitted special 
carve-out exception would have been inapplicable also. 
Besides, there were and currently are many differences between the 
FLSA and AMWA,214 making it inappropriate to interpret the statutes in the 
same manner. Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that it will 
not read a provision into a statute that has been left out by the Arkansas 
General Assembly.215 To do so would amount to legislating, which is not a 
 
 210. Appellees’ Brief at Arg. 4, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-
966) (citing Act of Mar. 28, 2007, No. 545, 2007 Ark. Acts 545). 
 211. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966) (citing Act of Mar. 
28, 2007, No. 545, 2007 Ark. Acts 545) (emphasis added). 
 212. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966) (citing Act of Mar. 
28, 2007, No. 545, 2007 Ark. Acts 545) (emphasis added). 
 213. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 10–14, 492 S.W.3d at 863–64. 
 214. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2017), with 29 
U.S.C §§ 201–219 (2012). See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial-Summary 
Judgment at 13–14, Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966) (highlighting 
the following differences between the two statutes: AMWA has a 3 year statute of limitations 
while the FLSA has a 2 year statute of limitations unless the violation is willful; AMWA 
limits an employer’s allowance for furnishing board, lodging, or apparel to $0.30 per hour 
while the FLSA allows an employer to pay all wages through facilities; Under the AMWA, 
movie theater employees are not exempt from overtime requirements, but these same 
employees are exempt under the FLSA). 
 215. “We decline to expand the statutory definition of disability in this manner as it 
would be akin to legislating.” Faulkner v. Arkansas Children’s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 955, 69 
S.W.3d 393, 402 (2002) (citing as examples Shoemaker v. State, 343 Ark. 727, 38 S.W.3d 
350 (2001) (refusing to judicially legislate a fighting-words exception into an otherwise 
constitutionally infirm statute); Four County (NW) Regional Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist. Bd. v. 
Sunray Serv., Inc., 334 Ark. 118, 971 S.W.2d 255 (1998) (rejecting de novo review of 
legislative action as judicial legislation violative of the separation-of-powers doctrine)). 
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function of the judiciary.216 The majority did nothing wrong by failing to 
incorporate the FLSA special carve-out exception into the AMWA, 
especially when it was not supported by the whole reading and interpretation 
of the AMWA before its amendment in 2017. 
Likewise, the ADOL would have intentionally incorporated the FLSA 
special carve-out exception into the AMWA through accompanying 
regulations if it had a desire to do so.217 The ADOL imposed certain 
regulations to incorporate certain definitions and provisions from the FLSA 
into the AMWA,218 but none of these regulations had included the special 
carve-out exception.219 
Finally, section 11-4-205 of the AMWA, which recognizes established 
contracts between parties, could not have been read in isolation, despite the 
dissent’s claims to the contrary. Rather, the majority read the statute in its 
entirety to ascertain the true meaning of the statute.220 So, construed in 
conjunction with sections 11-4-202, 11-4-204, and 11-4-218,221 the entirety 
of the statute had indicated that section 11-4-205 did not impact the 
majority’s holding. 
Section 11-4-202 demonstrates that the Arkansas General Assembly 
enacted the AMWA to benefit employees.222 Section 11-4-204, entitled 
“Law Most Favorable to Employees Applicable—Liberal Construction,” 
provides further in subsection 11-4-204(b) that the AMWA is to be 
“liberally construed in favor of its purposes and shall not limit any law or 
policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental wages or 
benefits.”223 From the onset, the statute makes clear that it is employee-
centered. 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial-Summary Judgment at 15–16, 
Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966) (citing as examples 010 Ark. Code 
R. § 14-100(B)(3) (incorporating work exempt under the FLSA into the AMWA definition of 
“agriculture”); 010 Ark. Code R. § 14-104 (incorporating the FLSA’s authorization to pay 
sub-minimum wage to learners, student learners, or apprentices); 010 Ark. Code R. § 14-
106(B)(1)(a) (incorporating FLSA regulations 29 C.F.R. Part 541 for purposes of defining 
and delimiting certain minimum wage and overtime exemptions). 
 218. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966). 
 219. Id., Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, 492 S.W.3d 856 (No. CV-15-966). 
 220. See Ryan & Co. v. Weiss, 371 Ark. 43, 263 S.W.3d 489 (2007). 
 221. See infra notes 222–26. 
 222. “It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas to establish minimum 
wages for workers in order to safeguard their health, efficiency, and general well-being and to 
protect them as well as their employers from the effects of serious and unfair competition 
resulting from wage levels detrimental to their health, efficiency, and well-being.” ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 11-4-202 (Repl. 2012). 
 223. Id. § 11-4-204(b) (emphasis added). 
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The then-existing section 11-4-218 reaffirmed the AMWA’s 
preferential treatment of the employee.224 Subsection 11-4-218(a)(1) states 
that an employer is liable to an employee if that employer pays less than the 
required minimum wages, including overtime compensation.225 Then, the 
former subsection 11-4-218(b) added, “Any agreement between the 
employee and employer to work for less than minimum wages shall be no 
defense to the action.”226 
Although the latter subsection does not mention overtime 
compensation specifically, it is fairly reasonable, when these two 
subsections are read in conjunction, to say that the latter subsection includes 
overtime compensation. Besides, the Arkansas Supreme Court held the 
power to interpret the phrase “minimum wages” to include overtime 
compensation upon a careful analysis of the whole statute. Accordingly, the 
majority properly rejected Gerber’s defense, which asserted that Gerber and 
the union’s pre-2013 agreements that treated mandatory donning and 
doffing as non-compensable for overtime compensation purposes were 
binding. For this reason, the legislature sought to eliminate the majority’s 
holding by preventing section 11-4-218(b) from interfering with collective-
bargaining rights under section 11-4-205. In essence, this action will provide 
unionized employers with exempt status from the AMWA, basically 
excusing them from all liability, and that is contrary to the spirit of the 
AMWA. 
Lastly, the dissent misinterpreted section 11-4-218(a)(1) when it 
asserted that Gerber did nothing wrong because it had not violated the 
minimum wage requirement of the AMWA.227 As previously stated, the 
current AMWA provides that an employer is liable to an employee if that 
employer pays less than the required minimum wages, including overtime 
compensation.228 Plaintiffs did not receive any overtime wages for the time 
required to don and doff prior to the 2013–2016 collective-bargaining 
agreement.229 Therefore, Gerber had violated the AMWA by failing to pay 
overtime compensation despite paying the required minimum wages. 
 
 224. Id. § 11-4-218 (entitled Employee’s Remedies). 
 225. Id. § 11-4-218(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 226. Id. § 11-4-218(b). 
 227. Gerber Prod. Co. v. Hewitt, 2016 Ark. 222, at 18–19, 492 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Wood, 
J., dissenting). 
 228. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 229. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 3, 492 S.W.3d at 858. 
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
The risk of donning and doffing litigation would have likely decreased 
over time in Arkansas if Gerber had not been overturned.230 The Arkansas 
Supreme Court provided clarity when interpreting mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing as compensable “work” under the AMWA.231 Most 
importantly, employers and employees would have been well aware that 
mandatory-workplace donning and doffing constituted “work,” thus, 
triggering compensation.232 For judicial administration purposes, such clarity 
would have contributed to judicial efficiency.233 
Despite economic claims that Gerber’s holding would have resulted in 
greater liability and costs for Arkansas employers,234 liability would have 
only been imposed if an employer had failed to compensate its employees 
for mandatory donning and doffing at the workplace as in Gerber.235 
Employees would have had to comply with the statute of limitations and 
other requisite matters to pursue a claim under the AMWA.236 Theoretically, 
it is unlikely that all, or substantially all, Arkansas employers require 
mandatory-workplace donning and doffing. For the employers that do not 
require such activities, the Gerber holding simply would not have applied. 
From an economic perspective, non-unionized and unionized 
employers and employees could have minimized increasing costs that might 
be associated with mandatory donning and doffing activities at the 
workplace. If feasible, not requiring mandatory donning and doffing at the 
workplace, which results in no additional costs for employers, would have 
been the simplest way to avoid costs. However, if that were not possible, 
another option could have required the employers and employees to be 
creative, such as discussing and implementing non-monetary incentives as a 
way to compensate the employees instead of the employers paying out 
actual money.237 And as previously discussed, unionized employers and 
employees could have negotiated a reasonable length of time in which the 
 
 230. See supra Part III.A. 
 231. See supra Part III.A. 
 232. See supra Part III.A. 
 233. See supra Part III.A. 
 234. Gerber, 2016 Ark. 222, at 14–19, 492 S.W.3d at 865–67 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 235. Id., at 1–14, 492 S.W.3d at 856–64. 
 236. See Douglas v. First, 2011 Ark 463, 385 S.W.3d 225. 
 237. See, e.g., Beatriz Valenzuela, Long Beach Police Lawsuits Go to Council for Vote, 
PRESS-TELEGRAM OP. (Apr. 10, 2014; 8:38 p.m.), 
https://www.presstelegram.com/2014/04/10/long-beach-police-lawsuits-go-to-council-for-
vote/ (discussing a settlement offering police officers extra vacation time for their workplace 
donning and doffing claims against the city). 
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employers would pay for the time associated with mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing activities.238 
Based on the majority’s correct interpretation of the former AMWA, 
the fact that Arkansas is not a heavily unionized state supported the court’s 
decision not to engraft the FLSA “changing-clothes” exception into the 
AMWA.239 Rated below a five percent in 2016, Arkansas’s union 
membership rate scored among the lowest of the states and fell far below the 
10.7% union membership average rate among the states.240 There are 
increasingly more non-unionized employers in Arkansas than unionized 
ones.241 From a social point of view, interpreting the AMWA to benefit 
employees and to exclude the special carve-out exception would have 
affected only a relatively small percentage of unionized employers in 
Arkansas.242 Likewise, it is unlikely that all Arkansas-unionized employers 
require some or substantially all of their employees to engage in mandatory-
workplace donning and doffing, and for the unionized employers who do 
not require it, the Gerber ruling would not have applied to them. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Due to the Arkansas General Assembly’s action of overturning Gerber, 
one potential problem remains unaddressed by the amended AMWA: how 
should courts interpret the added Portal-to-Portal Act language inserted into 
the AMWA in matters not involving collective-bargaining agreements that 
expressly waive compensation for mandatory-workplace donning and 
doffing activities at the workplace? Part III discusses how this problem may 
arise.243 As a reminder, the amended AMWA grants courts with permissive 
discretion to follow federal guidance when interpreting the AMWA.244 In 
other words, one court may choose to follow federal guidance, and another 
court may decide not to follow it. This would definitely lead to inconsistent 
 
 238. See supra Part III.C. 
 239. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that almost 1.2 million people composed 
Arkansas’s total employed population. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., UNION AFFILIATION OF 
EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY STATE, 2015-2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES, (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. Of Arkansas’s total employed population, 
only about five percent, or i.e. 59,000, were represented by unions. Id. 
 240. Bureau of Lab. Stat., UNION MEMBERSHIP RATES BY STATE, 2016 annual averages, 
Table 1, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
 241. See id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 244. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-4-218(f) (Repl. 2012 & Supp 2017). See also Act of Apr. 
5, 2017, No. 914, 2017 Ark. Acts 914 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-205, -218, -221). 
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court rulings should the issue arise.245 To resolve this issue, the legislature 
should amend the AMWA by adding language stating that courts must 
follow federal guidance.246 
That way, in cases involving non-unionized employers or unionized 
employers without collective-bargaining agreements that expressly waive 
compensation, adding this mandatory language will require courts to 
recognize mandatory-workplace donning and doffing as activities that are 
“integral and indispensable” to an employee’s principal job.247 Absent any 
agreements to the contrary, this recognition will require these employers to 
compensate their employees for these mandatory activities in spite of the 
Arkansas Portal-to-Portal Act exemption for preliminary and postliminary 
activities.248 That is because the Supreme Court of the United States created 
the “integral and indispensable” exception to the federal Portal-to-Portal Act 
language, which exempts employers from compensating their employees for 
performing preliminary and postliminary activities that are necessary in 
order to perform their principal jobs.249 
Without mandating that courts follow federal guidance, now that the 
AMWA has its own Portal-to-Portal Act language,250 a court choosing not to 
review federal guidance would not necessarily be inclined to require 
compensation for mandatory-workplace donning and doffing activities 
based on the AMWA statutory language alone. As of right now, there is no 
binding-Arkansas case law that imposes the “integral and indispensable” 
exception with respect to the Arkansas Portal-to-Portal Act exemption for 
preliminary and postliminary activities. Without any binding-state case law, 
the potential inconsistency runs the risks of creating uncertainty and diluting 
 
 245. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(f) (Supp. 2017). See also Act of Apr. 5, 2017, No. 
914. 
 246. For example, courts must interpret the Missouri Minimum Wage Law in accord with 
the FLSA and applicable regulations. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505(4). 
 247. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). See supra Part II.A(2). 
 248. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. See supra Part II.A(2). 
 249. Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256. See supra Part II.A(2). 
 250. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-221 (Supp. 2017). 
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judicial efficiency; therefore, the legislature should impose the requirement 
that courts must follow federal guidance. Plus, the amendment would 
benefit employees because employees deserve to be paid for their work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Gerber case allowed the Arkansas Supreme Court to provide 
clarity to an open issue of state law. Therefore, this note argues that the 
Arkansas Supreme Court properly decided Gerber. In responding to the 
legislative action overturning Gerber, this note also proposes an additional 
amendment to the AMWA that would address the proper application of the 
Arkansas Portal-to-Portal Act in matters not involving collective-bargaining 
agreements that expressly waive compensation for mandatory-workplace 
donning and doffing activities. 
To summarize, the Gerber holding did not repeat the alleged past 
mistakes of the federal government, did not fail to follow federal precedent, 
and did not undermine the collective-bargaining process between employers 
and unions. Unfortunately, overturning Gerber destroys the positive impact 
that the case was bound to have upon Arkansas. Moreover, the 2017 Act 
does not address all potential issues that could arise. With a specific focus 
on the Arkansas Portal-to-Portal Act, this note proposes that the legislature 
amend the AMWA, once more, to include a mandatory provision that 
require courts to follow federal guidance when interpreting the AMWA. The 
mandatory provision would eliminate the risks of creating uncertainty and 
diluting judicial efficiency, and it would allow employees to be 
compensated for work that is deemed “integral and indispensable,” for 
which they are required to perform at their workplaces. 
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